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NOTES
Charitable Immunity in Texas, Reconsidered
I.

FOUNDATIONS OF CHARITABLE IMMUNITY DOCTRINE

The charitable immunity doctrine absolves charitable institutions
from liability for most torts. The doctrine does not deny the existence of a tort, but it prevents recovery out of a charity's assets. The
first American cases granting this immunity were McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital' and Perry v. House of Refuge,' which
relied upon previously overruled English cases.' Thus, the charitable
immunity doctrine that was established in the United States was based
upon faulty precedent. Later application of the doctrine resulted in
the granting of immunity to a wide range of "charitable" organizations.'
Various theories have been used to support the charitable immunity doctrine. The most important of these is the "trust fund theory."
The McDonald and Perry cases, in adopting this theory, drew a parallel from the law of trusts and treated charitable assets as a trust fund
which the donor intended exclusively for charitable use. They held
that use of a charity's assets to pay a tort judgment would frustrate
donative intent and would deprive the public of the charity's benefits.' By considering the capital of a charity to be an inviolable trust,'
1 120
'63

Mass. 432 (1876).

Md. 20 (1885).
a McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 (1876), using as authority
the English case of Holliday v. Vestry of the Parrish of St. Leonard, 11 C.B. (n.s.) 192,
142 Eng. Rep. 769 (1861) which, in turn, relied upon dictum from Duncan v. Findlater,
6 Cl. & Fin. 894, 7 Eng. Rep. 934 (1839). Duncan was overruled by Mersey Docks Trustees
v. Gibbs, 1 H.L. 93, 11 Eng. Rep. 1500 (1866); while Holliday was overruled by Foreman
v. Mayor of Canterbury, 6 Q.B. 214 (1871). Perry v. House of Refuge, supra note 2, cited
as authority Heriot's Hosp. v. Ross, 12 Cl. & Fin. 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846); Heriot's
Hosp. was also repudiated by Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, supra.
'See Southern Methodist University v. Clayton, 142 Tex. 179, 176 S.W.2d 749 (1943);
City of Dallas v. Smith, 130 Tex. 225, 107 S.W.2d 872 (1937); Texas Cent. R. Co. v.
Zumwalt, 103 Tex. 603, 132 S.W. 113 (1910); Goelz v. J. K. & Susie L. Wadley Research
Institute & Blood Bank, 350 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) error ref. n.r.e.; Scott v.
Wm.M. Rice Institute, 178 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) error ref.; Baylor University v. Boyd, 18 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929). "Charity" does not imply, necessarily,
an institution which renders service without compensation from its beneficiaries. Nor does
the term imply that an institution must open its doors to all persons seeking the benefits of
its ministry. The fact that a charity actually operates at a profit in a particular phase of its
service has been held not to disqualify the charity from immunity. Governmental branches,
even though a fee is charged for services rendered, have been held to be charitable institutions and thus entitled to immunity if the operation in question is non-profit and charitable
in nature. Private companies and corporations operated for profit which set up charitable
corporations or administer charitable trusts for the benefit of their employees are generally
granted immunity in the operation of such trusts or divisions. See cases cited supra.
'Cases and text cited note 3 supra.
'Eads v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n, 325 Mo. 577, 29 S.W.2d 701 (1930).
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the theory confers upon charitable organizations and trustees a protection from fund dissipation not enjoyed by private trusts.!
The "waiver" theory rests upon the proposition that a beneficiary
of a charity impliedly waives the right to bring an action against it.'
By accepting the benefits and services rendered by the organization,
the beneficiary is held to forfeit his right to enforce a tort claim
against his benefactor.
A broader approach taken by courts is the "public policy" argument of encouraging benevolent groups by granting immunity.
Because charities benefit the general public, courts often hold that
encouraging their activity is of greater import than compensating
the loss suffered by a few individuals.! Fear of discouraging prospective donors, concern for the difficulty involved in securing donations,
and a disinclination to subject charities to litigation costs are all
relevant considerations in a public policy immunity base.
Wherever the doctrine is recognized, another means by which pro0
tection is often granted is the refusal to apply respondeat superior."
Since charities derive no pecuniary benefit from the acts of their

servants and agents, the respondeat superior liability usually resting
upon a master is not imposed upon charitable organizations. Apparently, the public policy considerations holding a master liable for the
torts of his servant have been felt to be less strong than those absolving

a charity from tort liability."
II. LIMITATIONS AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

A. Limits Of The Immunity
Exceptions to complete immunity are often made even by jurisdictions which adhere to the basic doctrine. If injuries occur while
the charity is engaged in a purely commercial endeavor, compromising
its charitable or non-profit purpose, recovery will sometimes be
allowed. This result follows even though the net profit from the commercial enterprise would be added to the general funds of the charity."
Larson, Liability of Trustees in Texas, 3 Sw. L.J. 135, 140-53 (1949). Private trustees
are not exempt from liability for torts committed in trust administration, and a private trust
res may be reached for satisfaction of tort liability. Also, as no immunity existed in the
donor, he can hardly be said to have the authority to confer such a benefit upon the receiving institution. Ibid.
' Powers v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hosp., 109 Fed. 294 (1st Cir. 1901), cert. denied,
183 U.S. 695 (1902). "[I]f a suffering man avails himself of their charity, he takes the
risks of malpractice.
...
Id. at 304.
9 Vermillion v. Woman's College of Due West, 104 S.C. 197, 88 S.E. 649 (1916).
"Emery
v. Jewish Hosp. Ass'n, 193 Ky. 400, 236 S.W. 577 (1921); Thornton v.
Franklin Square House, 200 Mass. 465, 86 N.E. 909 (1909); Southern Methodist University
v. Clayton, 142 Tex. 179, 176 S.W.2d 749 (1943).
I See cases supra note 10.
"Eiserhardt v. State Agric. & Mech. Society, 235 S.C. 305, 111 S.E.2d 568 (1959).
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If an otherwise charitable institution operates an office building,"3
a paid parking lot,' a student health insurance plan," or any other
profit-making activity unconnected with its main purpose, it will
usually be liable for torts arising from that phase of its operations.
Additional exceptions to the charitable immunity doctrine arise in
a variety of situations. Charity hospitals may be liable for injuries
caused by the negligence of their agents or servants if the negligence
can be classified as "administrative." ' "e Administrative negligence as
used here is the lack of due care in the selection or supervision of
employees. Courts in some states allow paying patients in hospitals to
recover for negligently caused injury but deny recovery to patients
who receive hospital services on a non-paying basis.' 7 In some jurisdictions the waiver theory is modified to allow "strangers" to recover
from the charity since such persons do not waive their right to hold
the charity liable by receiving benefits from it.'" A final partial
limitation is the policy of allowing recovery in tort where a charity
has liability insurance in force.' 9
"

Blatt v. George H. Nettleton Home for Aged Women, 275 S.W.2d 344 (Mo. 1955).

14 Eiserhardt v. State Agric. & Mech. Society, 235 S.C. 305, 111 S.E.2d 568 (1959).
15 Grueninger v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 343 Mass. 338, 178 N.E.2d 917

(1961).
6
' See, e.g., Bishop Randall Hosp. v. Hartley, 24 Wyo. 408, 160 P. 385 (1916). Cf. Berg.
v. New York Society for the Relief of the Ruptured and Crippled, 286 App. Div. 783, 146
N.Y.S.2d 548 (1955), overruled, Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957),
Note, 12 Sw. L.J. 244 (1958). See generally Hortz, The Status of the Doctrine of Charitable
Immunity in Hospital cases, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 343 (1964). Before the distinction between
"administrative" and "medical" negligence was abandoned in Bing v. Thunig, supra, the
New York courts had difficulty in applying the test. Attempts to classify negligent acts as
either medical or administrative led to the drawing of illusory distinctions. Compare Iacono
v. New York Polyclinic Med. School & Hosp., 296 N.Y. 502, 68 N.E.2d 450 (1946) (placing improperly capped hot water bottle on patient's body is administrative) with Sutherland
v. New York Polyclinic Med. School & Hosp., 298 N.Y. 682, 82 N.E.2d 583 (1948)
(keeping hot water bottle too long on patient's body is medical). Compare Necolayff v.
Genesee Hosp., 296 N.Y. 936, 73 N.E.2d 117 (1947) (giving blood transfusion to wrong
patient is administrative) with Berg v. New York Society for the Relief of the Ruptured
and Crippled, 1 N.Y.2d 499, 154 N.Y.S.2d 455, 136 N.E.2d 523 (1956) (administering
the wrong blood to the right patient is medical). Compare Peck v. Charles B. Towns Hosp.,
275 App. Div. 302, 89 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1949) (using improperly sterilized needle for hypodermic injection is administrative) with Bryant v. Presbyterian Hosp., 304 N.Y. 538, 110
(improperly administering a hypodermic injection is medical). For a
N.E.2d 391 (1953)
discussion of the charitable immunity rule of hospital cases in relation to the "borrowed
servant" doctrine, see Note, 19 Sw. L.J. 179 (1965).
17 Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915).
J'St. Vincent's Hosp. v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N.E. 537 (1924); Basabe v. Salvation
Army, 35 R.I. 22, 85 A. 120 (1912); Weston Adm'x v. Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul,
131 Va. 587, 107 S.E. 785 (1921).
"°Cox v. De Jarnette, 104 Ga. 664, 123 S.E.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1961); Moore v. Moyle,
405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950); Howard v. South Baltimore Gen. Hosp., 191 Md. 617,
62 A.2d 574 (1948); Vanderbilt Univ. v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S.W.2d 284
(1938).
[T]here are several . . . reasons why we think there should be no immunity
from tort liability accorded to a charitable institution to the extent that it
may be covered by a liability insurance policy. These . . . are: (1) The purpose
and intent of the charitable institution in securing a liability policy obviously
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B. Impetus For Change
In recent years, the entire doctrine of charitable immunity has
come under fire. In 1942, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in President and Directors of Georgetown College v.
Hughes"° examined, analyzed, and then rejected each theory in favor
of immunity. This decision has been the moving force behind the
abolition of charitable immunity in other jurisdictions." The trust
fund theory was refuted because of its lack of consistency with the
general law of trusts and because of the fiction which imputed to
charitable donors the intent to injure beneficiaries without recompense." The waiver theory was attacked as being without foundation
in law or in fact. *' Finally, Georgetown College refuted public policy
arguments in favor of immunity and introduced independent policy
factors supporting its abandonment."4 The tendency of immunity to
encourage neglect, the opposite tendency of liability to induce care,
protection of the individual, and the ability of most charities to bear
liability through insurance were major arguments made for abolition."s
In response to Georgetown College, some twenty-four states have
abandoned the doctrine; while other jurisdictions have limited in part
appears to be in the interest of furthering its beneficent enterprises by precluding uncompensated injury and damage to one which may be occasioned
by its actions in carrying out its charitable functions. . . . (2) The delivery
and the acceptance of an insurance liability policy between an insurance company and a charitable institution and the payment and acceptance of its premium constitutes, as to the amount of the policy, a waiver by the charity and
by the insurance company of the immunity otherwise accorded to the charitable assets. (3) It would appear to be a violation of public policy to permit
an insurance company to sell liability insurance for a consideration paid from
charitable assets and then to allow or to permit the insurance company to
preclude all liability by hiding behind the veil of the insured's charitable
immunity.
Cox v. De Jarnette, supra at 22-23.
Thus, some jurisdictions appear to have a "waiver" theory which waives immunity when
a charitable institution is covered by liability insurance. In a field where many courts
speak of public policy as favoring complete immunity, the Georgia court rests its holding
on policy considerations which counter the usual arguments. Though the presence of liability
insurance would seem to negate the considerations behind the trust fund and public policy
theories, in most jurisdictions insurance coverage does not make recovery possible even when
it can be shown that recovery will not deplete the assets of the charity. See, e.g., Schulte
v. Missionaries of La Salette Corp. of Missouri, 352 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. 1961); Baptist
Memorial Hosp. v. McTihge, 303 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error ref. n.r.e.
2076 U.S. App. D.C. 123, 130 F.2d 810 (1942) (three judges allowing recovery because
plaintiff was stranger to charity and three allowing recovery as a consequence of abolishing
charitable immunity). Rutledge, J., delivered the opinion of the court, and, though the case
was a split decision, the opinion is regarded as a definitive work on charitable immunity and
is widely cited.
as PRossER, TORTS, § 127, at 1020-21 (3d ed. 1964).
22 President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 76 U.S. App. D.C. 132, 130
F.2d 810, 824-26 (1942).
2
1d. at 826.
24Id. at 823-26.
25 Ibid.

1966]

NOTES

its scope and effect.' Some courts, however, have felt bound by stare
decisis or have exercised judicial restraint because of a supposed legislative prerogative in changing existing public policy. 7
C. The Texas Charitable Immunity Doctrine
Texas courts have developed a body of law on charitable immunity
based mainly on public policy considerations." The policy giving rise
to charitable protection prevents placing the potential liability of
respondeat superior upon charities unless they are administratively
negligent in the selection or retention of servants and agents." Employees of a charity, however, may recover for injury if the injury
results from a breach of duty owed in the master-servant relationship.3" Negligence of the charity itself will also result in liability if
improper equipment for treatment or service is provided.31 But
without a showing of institutional negligence no tort liability for
injury can be placed upon a charitable institution. The Texas courts
make no exceptions for "strangers" to the charity; depletion of
charitable assets takes place whether recovery is had by a stranger
or a beneficiary." Neither is an exception made when liability insurance is present," though there is a dictum in one case indicating that
this might make a difference. 4 In general, Texas courts of civil
appeals seem to be bound by stare decisis to continue application of
the existing charitable immunity doctrine."2 Also, as late as 1962 the
"For cases limiting the operation of charitable immunity see, Parker v. Port Huron
Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960), Note, 16 Sw. L.J. 689 (1962); Foster v. Roman
Catholic Diocese of Vermont, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A.2d 230 (1950). Complete rejection seems
to be the current trend. For a general discussion of the problem and for a listing of cases
in which immunity has been abandoned see Fisch, Charitable Liability for Tort, 10 VILL.
L. REv. 71 (1964).
27 See, e.g., Helter v. Sisters of Mercy of St. Joseph's Hospital, 234 Ark. 76, 351 S.W.2d
129 (1961)
(doctrine so firmly established as to be a rule of property); Schulte v. Missionaries of La Salette Corp. of Missouri, 352 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. 1961); Jones v. Baylor
Hosp., 284 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
" See cases cited note 4 supra.
29 See, e.g., Southern Methodist University v. Clayton, 142 Tex. 179, 176 S.W.2d 749
(1943); Baylor University v. Boyd, 18 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Koenig v. Baylor Hosp., 10 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
' Hotel Dieu v. Armendarez, 210 S.W. 518 (Tex. Comm. App. 1919).
aBaptist Memorial Hosp. v. Marrable, 244 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) error
ref. n.r.e. "It is undoubtedly the duty of a charitable hospital to furnish proper and suitable
equipment free from defects for the care and treatment of such patients as it accepts and
this duty is a non-delegable duty." Id. at 568.
" See, e.g., Southern Methodist University v. Clayton, 142 Tex. 179, 176 S.W.2d 749
(1943); Baylor University v. Boyd, 18 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
'Baptist Memorial Hosp. v. McTighe, 303 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error
ref. n.r.e. "'We have not found any authority in Texas . . . where the presence of an
insurance policy caused any change in the liability or immunity of a charity institution."
Id. at 448.
'J. Weingarten v. Sanchez, 228 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) error ref. "[Ilt
would certainly not be against public policy to permit pupils to enforce the full extent of
any security obtained by a public charity for their benefit ..
." Id. at 311.
3' See, e.g., Jones v. Baylor Hosp., 284 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
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Texas Supreme Court seemed disinclined to modify the existing rule
in any way." A recent decision by that court in Watkins v. Southcrest
7
Baptist Church,"
however, indicates that future change in or abolition
of the doctrine may be likely.
III.

WATKINS V.

SOUTHCREST BAPTIST CHURCH

Mrs. Watkins brought suit against the Southcrest Baptist Church
of Lubbock, Texas, for injuries incurred when she slipped and fell
while on the church premises. The church filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that it was a charitable, religious corporation
and thus was immune from tort liability. The parties stipulated that
the church had liability insurance in force, though the amount of
coverage and exact provisions of the policy were not shown. In granting the motion for summary judgment, the trial court relied principally upon the decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Southern
Methodist University v. Clayton." The court of civil appeals affirmed
the judgment, stating that the supreme court had earlier been presented an opportunity to make an exception to immunity where
insurance was in force but had refused to do so."9 The supreme court
affirmed the judgments of the lower courts."
The opinion of the courts, written by Justice Norvell, reaffirms the
doctrine of charitable immunity as defined in Southern Methodist
University v. Clayton." Though this doctrine was created judicially
in Texas, the opinion indicated that its abolition should be effected
by legislative action. 2 The court, therefore, refrained from changing
present immunity rules, stating that charities in general and the
church in particular should be entitled to rely upon former decisions."
A concept of institutional waiver of immunity through purchase of
liability insurance was dismissed with the statement that "the procuring of indemnity insurance cannot create liability where none
exists in the absence of such insurance." 44 The court upheld the
Clayton doctrine without change. However, a significant portion of
' Goelz v. J. K. & Susie L. Wadley Research Institute, 350 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App.
1961) error ref. n.r.e.
3399 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. 1966).
'8142 Tex. 179, 176 S.W.2d 749 (1943).
"' Watkins v. Southcrest Baptist Church, 385 S.W.2d 723, 724 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964),
aff'd, 399 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. 1966). The earlier case mentioned by the court of civil appeals
was Baptist Memorial Hosp. v. McTighe, 303 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error ref.
n.r.e. See quotation accompanying note 33 supra.
4 Watkins v. Southcrest Baptist Church, 399 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. 1966).
41142 Tex. 179, 176 S.W.2d 749 (1943).
42 399 S.W.2d at 533-34.
4
d. at 534.
44Ibid.
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the court's membership would abolish the immunity doctrine altogether, or at least leave the court free to consider changes in the rule
the next time the question is presented.
Justice Walker concurred in the result but would announce that
the doctrine of charitable immunity would not be recognized in
future cases coming before the court.4 Justice Greenhill, joined by
Justice Steakley, also agreed with the result but stated that the court
should feel free to re-examine the doctrine at its next presentation."
Citing Georgetown College, Justice Greenhill stated that he is "impressed with the arguments made that the doctrine of charitable immunity may now be unsound in the light of current conditions, particularly as to some 'charities' which now enjoy immunity. Some 'charities' are now large business institutions which make substantial
charges for their services.'4'
The dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Calvert in which Justice
Smith joined is a plea for abolition of charitable immunity. It would
overturn the doctrine "without distinction as to the nature or character of the various charitable organizations." 8 If necessary, the dissent
would abolish it "effective upon adjournment of the Regular Session
of the 60th Legislature in 1967, thus permitting the Legislature to act
in the matter if it wished to do so."" With one justice calling for prospective overruling, two asking for re-examination at a future date,
and two more in favor of abolition in any way possible, judicial support in Texas for charitable immunity appears to be diminishing.
IV. CONCLUSION

The court's opinion in Watkins v. Southcrest Baptist Church never
actually faces the basic question raised by Georgetown College" and
other cases-whether charitable immunity is beneficial or necessary
in view of present conditions. That the issues raised in Georgetown

College had been considered in Southern Methodist University v.
Clayton seemed sufficient reason to four justices to dismiss them again

in Watkins. Clayton was decided in 1943, more than twenty years
ago; while Georgetown College was decided one year earlier in 1942.
If the argument that charitable immunity had outlived its usefulness
was cogent at the time of the Georgetown College decision, further
4

1ld. at 535 (Walker, J., concurring in separate opinion).
at 535-36 (Greenhill, J., concurring in separate opinion).
1 d. at 535.
4
1Id.
at 536 (Calvert, C. J.,dissenting).
49Ibid.
",President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 123, 130
F.2d 810 (1942). See text accompanying note 20 supra.
4"'Id.
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change in conditions might force the conclusion that it would be
even more cogent today.
Two factors which have changed the nature of charities over the
past twenty years were only beginning to emerge at the time of
Georgetown College and Clayton. Prevalence of hospitalization insurance and community support for charities have since that time caused
a significant shift in the source of charitable revenue.
If charitable hospital revenue were formerly derived in the main
from contributions, today the principal source is insurance payments." In 1941, about twelve million people were covered under
some form of health plan." By 1958 this number had increased to one
hundred and twenty-three million." In 1955, it was estimated that
one-half of the gross charges in American hospitals were paid by
insurance benefits."4 It is probable that this revenue percentage has
increased considerably, for today out of every hundred Americans,
seventy-one have hospital insurance; sixty-three have surgical insurance; and forty-three have medical insurance coverage." Though
hospitalization insurance affects only revenue of hospitals, its importance in a consideration of immunity in general may be verified by
noting that hospital cases provide the majority of charitable immunity decisions in the reports.
Another shift in revenue has been caused by community support
and recognition of charities. The sustenance provided by the community-wide, united charity drive has decreased in importance the
gifts of individual benefactors and has provided the charity with a
regular source of revenue. Some businesses strongly encourage their
employees to contribute to such fund-raising drives, even to the point
of "suggesting" a minimum acceptable percentage-of-salary contribution. Such activity might be encouraged in order to provide better
services and facilities, but in accepting funds from a public drive, the
charity should recognize a corresponding duty of care to the public.
Placing a sense of civic obligation upon the populace to donate to
united drives does not mesh well with a denial of liability through
charitable immunity. If charities are deserving and appropriate objects
of public generosity, the charity should at least compensate its donorpublic for harm caused through its own negligent acts.
"'Note, Charitable Immunity-The Road to Destruction, 32 TEMp. L.Q. 86, 91-93

(1958).

52Saturday Evening Post, The Post Reports on Health Insurance, June 7, 1958.
51Ibid.
5

'Avellone v. St. John's Hosp., 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410, 415 (1956).
Statistical Abstract of the United States 78, Table 84 (1955).
" Saturday Evening Post, supra note 52.

See also
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The increasing tendency of charities to operate on a "big business"
basis is mentioned as another reason for denying immunity." Though
the large corporate image cannot be ascribed to every charity, those
charities which utilize the services of collection agencies for unpaid
bills do not strengthen the picture of institutions seeking to assuage
the ills and woes of mankind.
By reaffirming the Clayton decision, the court retains its public
policy basis. If the Texas immunity doctrine is to continue to be justified on policy considerations, however, these considerations should be
expressed in terms of present conditions. Growing centralization of
charitable activities, widespread availability of liability insurance,
growth of charitable assets, more liberal federal tax deductions for
charitable contributions,"7 and increasing public contact with charitable institutions are but a few of the factors deserving consideration
by the court. Assuming the same factors which the court used to
justify the Clayton decision are equally relevant today, a finding to
that effect should be made instead of a mere recital of precedent as in
Watkins.
The apparent deference to the legislature where a change in established policy is involved is in accord with recent decisions dealing with
the charitable immunity problem."8 If the legislature has an inviolable
prerogative in regard to a well-established, though judicially-created,
doctrine, the decision must be viewed as correct. On the other hand,
"eWatkins v. Southcrest Baptist Church, 399 S.W.2d 530, 535 (1966)

(Greenhill, J.,

concurring in separate opinion).
17For years the individual taxpayer could not deduct more than 15% of his adjusted
gross income for contributions made to charitable organizations. In 1952 this limit was expanded to 20%. The real expansion, though, came in 1954 when Congress allowed an additional 10% deduction for contributions to a special group of charitable donees, bringing
the aggregate limit on charitable deductions for an individual taxpayer to 30%. In 1964
Congress went a step farther in enlarging the list of "30% charities" and in allowing individuals to carry forward contributions to such charities which exceed the limit for a
five-year period. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170. The individual 30% limit does not apply
if the taxpayer's charitable contributions and income taxes have exceeded 90% of taxable
income for eight of the ten immediately preceding years. In this situation, the taxpayer is
entitled to unlimited deductions for charitable contributions. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, 5
170(b) (1) (C).
In addition to the individual deductions provided by § 170, the Code provides that a
donor is not subject to federal gift tax on gifts to charities. Another tax advantage is that
charitable bequests by a decedent may be deducted in computing federal estate tax liability.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2055, 2522.
In view of the significant tax savings available to individuals in high tax brackets through
use of charitable contributions, the importance of tax provisions as a spur to charitable
gifts certainly should be recognized. Indeed, in cases of large charitable donations, the tax
angle may outweigh pure generosity as a motive for making the gift. Tax provisions remain
the same whether or not the charity is liable in tort. Thus, at least one impetus for charitable donations would remain constant if liability in tort were imposed on charities and would
perhaps offset potential reluctance of donors to have their gifts used to satisfy judgments.
s"See, e.g., Landgraver v. Emanuel Lutheran Charity Bd., 203 Or. 489, 280 P.2d 301
(1955) (change should be a matter solely for legislative determination).
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the court seems to be tying its own hands unnecessarily. The concern
for institutions relying upon the established policy could be satisfied
by a form of prospective overruling or by giving notice of future
reconsideration."' When giving the legislature an opportunity to
decide an issue is of paramount importance, the third alternative suggested by Chief Justice Calvert's dissenting opinion could be used. By
making abolition effective upon adjournment of the next regular session of the legislature, the court's decision would be contingent upon
tacit approval being given by the silence of that body."5 Notice of
future re-evaluation, as suggested by Justice Greenhill, also would
give the legislature an opportunity to speak."' This form of notice
must be contrasted with the "Sunburst ' approach to prospective
5 399 S.W.2d at 535-36 (Greenhill, J., concurring in separate opinion); Id. at 536
(Calvert, C. J., dissenting).
60Ibid.
6 Id. at 535-36 (Greenhill, J., concurring in separate opinion).

0' The term comes from the style of a Supreme Court case in which the method of prospective overruling was upheld as constitutional. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil
& Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932), affirming 91 Mont. 216, 7 P.2d 927 (1932). Mr. Justice
Cardozo delivered the opinion of the Court only a short time after he had delivered an
address to the New York State Bar Association concerning the prospective overruling question. While still chief judge of the New York Court of Appeals, Cardozo repeated his belief
that actual reliance on prior decisions was not as widespread as it was often assumed to be.
In cases where strong reliance was present, however, he suggested an application of the
former rule to the case at bar with an announcement that the court would feel free to
apply another principle in future cases. Emphasizing more the announcement of future change
than the explicit definition of a new rule, Cardozo realized this would leave the law in a
state of uncertainty. Though an announcement of a new principle was only a dictum, he
felt parties could rely on the probability that a court would follow such a dictum at the
next presentation of a question. Address by Chief Judge Cardozo, New York State Bar Association, January 22, 1932, in 55 Report of N.Y.S.B.A. 263, 294-96 (1932). See generally
Levy, Realistic Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling 109, U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1960).
The Sunburst case involved a state court statutory interpretation which was not made
retroactive. Upholding the procedure used by the Montana court against constitutional attack, Cardozo said:
The common law as administered by her judges ascribes to the decisions of her
highest court a power to bind and loose that is unextinguished, for intermediate transactions, by a decision overruling them. As applied to such transactions
we may say of the earlier decision that it has not been overruled at all.
It has been translated into a judgment of affirmance and recognized as law
anew. Accompanying the recognition is a prophecy, which may or may not
be realized in conduct, that transactions arising in the future will be governed
by a different rule.
Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., supra at 365-66.
The "Sunburst" doctrine has been praised for its contribution to judicial flexibility.
Prospective overruling is only one of many positive ways of placing newly
formulated judicial law on a sound basis. . . .The future beckons us to experiment, once the dead past has buried its long since dead. For when we see the
judge as himself, a partial legislator in a period of legislative dominance, we
shall be freed to devote a disciplined and unencumbered imagination to the
task of aiding judicial lawmakers to perform their duties with facilities more
appropriate to their function.
Levy, supra at 30.
Yet acceptance of the doctrine has not been complete. Compare Note, 42 YALE L.J. 779,
782 (1933); 28 ILL. L. REv. 277, 280 (1933) and 60 HARv. L. REV. 437, 439-40 (1947),
with Note, 47 HARv. L. REv. 1403, 1412 (1934).
Justice Walker's position in Watkins corresponds to the holding in the Sunburst decision,
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overruling advocated by Justice Walker's concurring opinion. Such
a position would adhere to precedent in the particular case before
the court but would announce a different rule to be applied in later
cases. Use of the "Sunburst" doctrine can give rise to objections,6
but in spite of these criticisms, even the "Sunburst" approach could
counter the reasons given by the Texas Supreme Court for its hesitation."
The court correctly recognized that the legislative process is more
flexible than judicial decision and that it often is more deliberate. 6
However, these advantages are often outweighed by legislative vulnerability to special interest pressure and by inaction in the face of
emotional issues.'" This especially might be true in a consideration of
charitable immunity. Where religious groups in particular wield effective and highly organized legislative pressure, a rational and unemotional discussion of the merits might not be possible.
The decision in Watkins solves for the moment the issue of retention of charitable immunity in Texas. The reasons given by the court
for retention, however, are not particularly convincing or satisfying.
With a majority of the court now committed to abolition or re-examination, Watkins may point the way to eventual discard of the charitable immunity rule in Texas.
Teddy M. Jones, Jr.

but Justice Greenhill's suggestion that notice of future re-evaluation be given was also
endorsed by Cardozo. See Address by Chief Judge Cardozo, New York State Bar Association,
January 22, 1932, in 55 Report of N.Y.S.B.A. 263, 294-96 (1932).
63 The three principal objections to use of the Sunburst approach are: (1) while a court
may refrain from making a statutory interpretation retrospective, it should not do so as regards a common-law rule; (2) announcement of the new rule would be mere dictum and
would not be binding on the court; (3) the procedure discourages litigants from appealing
since changes by the court would not benefit them. Levy, note 62 supra.
"' See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
65 399 S.W.2d at 533.

" Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 43 Wash.2d 162, 260 P.2d 765, 775
(1953) (concurring opinion by Grady, C. J.):
[E]xperience has demonstrated that when immunity from liability is involved,
legislatures are faced with strong opposition to change by those who are
the beneficiaries of such rule, and proponents of a change find efforts to secure
corrective legislation futile. When such a situation arises and the courts have
become convinced that the rule should no longer exist, there is justification
for action to be taken by them.

